DePaul Journal of Art, Technology
& Intellectual Property Law
Volume 27
Issue 2 Spring 2017

Article 7

Foster v. Svenson, 128 A.D.3d 150 (2015)
Mary Bessone

Follow this and additional works at: https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip
Part of the Computer Law Commons, Cultural Heritage Law Commons, Entertainment, Arts, and
Sports Law Commons, Intellectual Property Law Commons, Internet Law Commons, and the Science and
Technology Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Mary Bessone, Foster v. Svenson, 128 A.D.3d 150 (2015), 27 DePaul J. Art, Tech. & Intell. Prop. L. 271
(2019)
Available at: https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol27/iss2/7

This Case Summaries is brought to you for free and open access by the College of Law at Digital
Commons@DePaul. It has been accepted for inclusion in DePaul Journal of Art, Technology & Intellectual Property
Law by an authorized editor of Digital Commons@DePaul. For more information, please contact
digitalservices@depaul.edu.

Bessone: Foster v. Svenson, 128 A.D.3d 150 (2015)

FOSTER v. SVENSON,
128 A.D.3d 150 (2015).
I.

INTRODUCTION

The right to privacy and the right to free speech have been
essential in the formation of the modem day United States.' As
society evolves, the rights we enjoy expand and evolve with us. 2
Today, technology has blurred the lines between the right to
privacy and the right to artistic expression under free speech.3
While both are of the upmost importance, what if someone was
asked to choose one to keep, and be forced to abandon the other?
However, the question is far less abstract when artists aim to
capture humanity through a socio-anthropological lens. 4
Foster v. Svenson, came before the New York Supreme
Court Appellate Division in 2015.5
The Fosters, plaintiffsappellants ("the Fosters") brought suit after they discovered
photographs of their young children, which had been secretly
captured, being publically exhibited, and sold.6 The Fosters
alleged that their right to privacy had been violated, and brought
action pursuant to the New York State Privacy Statute.7

1See Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L.
REV. 193, 197 (1890); U.S. Const. amend. I (the right to free speech as a right
rotected within the constitution).
Warren & Brandeis, supra note 1, at 195-96.
Foster v. Svenson, 128 A.D.3d 150, 152 (N.Y. App. Div. 2015); Technology
has created tension in other areas of law relating to art as well. See Blanch v.
Koons, 467 F.3d 244, 246 (2d Cir. 2006) (artist sued for copyright infringement
after using scanned copyrighted images in his own work).
4 Arne Svenson, The Neighbors, http://amesvenson.com/theneighbors.html (last
visited May 17, 2017).
Foster, 128 A.D.3d at 150.
6 Id. at 152-54.
Id.
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The defendant-respondent, Arne Svenson ("Svenson,"), a
fine art photographer, took photographs of his neighbors, including
the Fosters family, through their New York apartment windows
without their knowledge.8
The photos, meant to be a social documentary series, were
captured by Svenson using a powerful camera while he was inside
his own apartment across the street.9 Standing in "the shadows,"
he would sometimes wait hours for his subjects to appear through
the glass and capture them uninhibited in their most intimate of
spaces, the privacy of their own home.o In Svenson's promotion
of the series it was stated: "for his 'subjects there is no question of
privacy; they are performing behind a transparent scrim on a stage
of their own creation with the curtain raised high."'
While the court was not shy about its distaste for the
unsettling facts of the case, and referred to Svenson's conduct as
"disturbing," the court ultimately held that Foster's had not
sufficiently alleged a cause of action for a violation under the
privacy statute.
II.

BACKGROUND

Arne Svenson is a known photographer who has shown his
In 2012, he began
work both domestically and abroad.1 3
documenting his year-long project that would eventually become
"The Neighbors," by secretly photographing residents of
apartment building across the street.1 4 Once completed, "The

8

9

Id. at 152-53.
Id. at 152.

10

Id. (recount from a reporter for the New Yorker Magazine while spending
time with Svenson's while photographing for The Neighbors).
" Foster, 128 A.D.3d at 153.
12
13
14

Id. at 163.
Id. at 152.

Id. at 152-53.
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Neighbors" was exhibited in galleries in New York and Los
Angeles.1 5
The Fosters heard about the series and discovered that their
minor children were the un-consenting subjects of two
photographs for sale.' 6 Upon seeing the photographs, the Fosters
demanded Svenson cease displaying and selling the images.' 7
Svenson agreed to remove one image of the Foster's son in a
diaper and daughter in her swimsuit, but did not commit to
removing the second image from the exhibit.1 8
The second
photograph depicted the mother holding her daughter, with the
daughter's face identifiable in the image. 19 The photograph was
then shown on various popular television shows during discussions
of Svenson and his exhibit. 20
In 2013, the Fosters brought action in the Supreme Court of
New York, seeking a preliminary injunction and a temporary
restraining order. 2 1 They further moved for injunctive relief and
damages under the privacy statute and common law intentional
infliction of emotional distress.22 Svenson filed an opposition to
the motion for a preliminary injunction and a cross motion to
dismiss. 23
He claimed the photographs were art that were
protected under the First Amendment of the United States

s Id. at 153.

16 Svenson made an effort to "obscure his subjects' identity"
in his photographs,
but in these two photos the Foster children could be identified. Id. at 153.
7 The Fosters through council, also contacted the gallery where the photos
were
being shown and online auction house demanded they take down the images as
well,
both complied. Foster, 128 A.D.3d at 153.
18
19

id.

Id.
One of the popular programs was the Today Show. Further, the address of the
apartment building was also identified in the press coverage in print, electronic
media and social media. Id. at 154.
21 Id.
20

22 Fd.
23 Foster, 128 A.D.3d at 154.
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Constitution; thus, restraining their publication, sale, and use, was
improper.24
The trial court granted Svenson's cross motion to dismiss
because his conduct was not an actionable invasion of privacy
under the privacy statute. 25 The trial court found that although the
plaintiffs may "cringe" knowing that their private lives and photos
of their children were in a public exhibition, Svenson's art was
protected under the First Amendment. 2 6 The Fosters subsequently
appealed the trial court's decision. The New York Supreme Court
Appellate Division was tasked with reviewing the lower court's
denial of the preliminary injunction and dismissal of the
complaint, on the basis that the defendant's alleged invasion of
privacy was not actionable conduct under the privacy statute. 27
The appellate court ultimately affirmed the lower court's
decision. 28
III.

LEGAL ANALYSIS

On appeal, the New York Supreme Court Appellate
Division was asked to review whether Svenson's conduct was
actionable, or whether it fell outside the reach of the privacy
statute. 29 Given that this issue was never previously presented
before the court, the appellate court's decision was guided by the
language and history of the statute itself, as well as previous
decisions dealing with similar issues of First Amendment
protection. 30

24

d

25

d

Id.; Foster v. Svenson, No. 651826/2013, 2013 WL 3989038, at *6 (N.Y.Sup.
Ct. 2013) (aff'd by Foster, 128 A.D.3d).
27 Foster, 128 A.D.3d at 154. See also N.Y. Civil Rights Law §§ 50-51
(McKinney 2017).
28 Foster, 128 A.D.3d at 163.
29
Id. at 157.
26

30oid.
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A. New York State's Privacy Statute
The New York State's privacy statute was a legislative
response to the 1902 decision of Roberson v. Rochester Folding
Box Co., where a flour company printed, sold, and posted 25,000
lithograph prints and photos of the plaintiff, in public places
without the her consent.3 1 The plaintiff sought an injunction and
monetary damages which was granted and affirmed on appeal.3 2
The decision rested on the determination that the mass distribution
of her image and likeness was an invasion of her right to privacy
and "to be left alone." 33 The decision was subsequently reversed
by the Court of Appeals of New York, which held there was no
common law right to privacy. 3 4 The court reasoned that it was for
the legislative branch to make unconsented use of one's image or
likeness for the purpose of advertising, a wrong under the law.3 5
The reversal sparked public disapproval and within a year
of the decision, New York's legislators enacted a statutory right to
privacy. 36 The privacy statute prohibited the use of a person's
"name, portrait or picture" or "name, portrait, picture or voice" for
the purposes of advertisingor trade.

" Id. at 154-55 (citing Roberson v. Rochester Folding Box Co., 64 N.E. 442
(N.Y. 1902)).
32 id
33

Id. (citing Roberson v. Rochester Folding-Box Co., 64 A.D. 30, 33 (N.Y.
App. Div. 1901) (rev'dsub nom Roberson, 64 N.E. 442)).
34
Foster, 128 A.D.3d at 154-55 (citing Roberson, 64 N.E. 442).
1 5 Id. at 155.
16 Id. at 154.
37 The Foster court expressly describes the two phrases, "advertising" and
"trade", used in the statute to define the unauthorized use prohibited under the
statute. Id. at 155 (citing N.Y. Civil Rights Law §§ 50-51 (McKinney 2017)).
Additionally, the court details the relief under the sections stating: Section 50
provides criminal punishment for such prohibited use, and Section 51 provides
an individual victim of a prohibited "appropriation" the right to an injunction
and to bring a cause of action for "compensatory and exemplary damages." Id.
(citing N.Y. Civil Rights Law §§ 50-51 (McKinney 2017)). The court is
expressly troubled that the law, while at first glance seems to provide a cause of
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B. The Privacy Statute and the FirstAmendment
The legislative decision to use the broad terms
"advertising" and "trade" as phrases for prohibited use seemed to
support the Foster's claim that the sale of any item, includinq
Svenson's photograph, fell under such use in the privacy statute.3
However, the privacy statute was created with the First
Amendment in mind and therefore courts have refused to impose a
literal construction on the terms. 3 9 Past decisions by courts
confronted with similar issues, have determined that a more
narrow reading is necessary in order to find a balance between
private individual rights and the rights granted under the First
Amendment. 40

Thus, the phrases used in §§ 50-51 of the privacy statute to
define the prohibited use of one's image should not apply to
"publications regarding newsworthy events and matters of public
concern."41 The newsworthy and public concern exception of the
privacy statue was meant to protect the distribution of ideas of
publically relevant importance. 4 2 Therefore, the Foster court had
to address the issue of whether the newsworthy and public concern
exception could be applied to Svenson's photograph. 4 3 The court
looked to pervious decisions where the exception had been applied
to different mediums of First Amendment expression. 4 4
action for the Fosters, ultimately does not; the detailed discussion of the statute
and the case that sparked its creation is an intentional judicial move to get the
attention of the legislators once again. Id. at 155, 163.
38
Foster, 128 A.D.3d at 156.
39

1[d.

40

Id. at 155-56 (citing Arrington v. N.Y. Times Co., 434 N.E.2d 1319, 1324
(1982)); see Howell v. New York Post Co., 612 N.E.2d 699, 705 (N.Y. 1993)
(Court of Appeals of New York holding that the privacy statute should not be
interpreted to apply to publications regarding newsworthy events and issues of
public concern).
41 Foster, 128 A.D.3d at 156.
42 id.
43

1Id. at 156-157.

44

Id. at 156.
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Past decisions protected works of literature, performances,
and film from violating the privacy statute, reasoning that the
social interest of access to information outweighed interest in
limiting such access. 4 5 The appellate court, guided by past
decisions, determined that the newsworthy and public concern
exception should apply to other mediums of expression such as
works of art.4 6 Therefore, works of art that present valuable ideas
of public concern fall outside the scope of the privacy statute, and
should be protected from liability. 47
Although the court was "constrained to concur" that the
exception to the privacy statute included works of art, the court did
examine the limits of the exception,4 8 and determined that the
limits to the exemption apply to images where the newsworthy or
public interest characteristics are simply "incidental" to the
commercial purpose. 4 9 In other words, the exception would not
apply to an image that appeared in the media, behind a fagade of
being newsworthy, but in reality was an "advertisement in
disguise." Falling out of the exception, such an image would
violate the privacy statute because under the faade, it was an
advertisement that served a commercial purpose.s Similarly, the
exception would not apply where there was no actual relationship
between a use of one's photo or name and the article it
45 The court discussed other cases found that an artist artistic expression and

creation was fully protected by the first amendment and thus shielded from an
individual's right to preclude the use of their image, likeness, or an image
created by them pursuant to the privacy statute. One case discussed presented
the court with the same issue presented in Foster. While the majority dismissed
the constitutional issues as time barred, the concurrence did reach the issues and
fund the image at issue to be protected under the First Amendment. Id. at 158;
see Nussenzweig v. diCorcia, 38 A.D.3d 339, 341 (N.Y. App. Div. 2007) (affd,
878 N.E.2d 589 (N.Y. 2007)).
46
Foster, 128 A.D.3d at 159.
47

d
48 id.
49
d

50ld.; see e.g. Beverley v. Choices Women's Med. Ctr., 587 N.E.2d 275, 278-280
(N.Y. 1991).
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illustrated.5 1 The court reasoned that with no actual relationship to
the advertisement, it would be reasonable to assume that the
image's only purpose was to sell the work.5 2
Although the appellate court examined the limits of the
privacy statute, it ultimately held that, the newsworthy and public
concern exception applied; and the Fosters did not sufficiently
plead a cause of action for a violation under the privacy statute. 5 3
To prevail, the Fosters would have had to sufficiently allege that
Svenson used the photographs "for the purpose of advertising or
for purpose of trade within the meaning of the privacy statute." 5 4
Instead, the Fosters' complaint only alleged that Svenson had used
their images to promote his exhibition "The Neighbors" in the
media, an exhibition that included photographs taken "under the
same circumstances" as the photos of their children.5 5 Further, the
complaint alleged that the photographs were for sale at the exhibit
and online. 5 6 Such claims did not allege that Svenson used the
photographs "forthe purpose of advertising orfor [the] purpose of
trade within the meaning of the privacy statute."
The court found that since the photographs themselves
constituted the work of art that was protected by the First
Amendment, any advertising Svenson done in connection with
their promotion was permissible.5 8 Thus, "under any reasonable
view of the allegations," the court could not infer that the images
of the Fosters were used for the purpose of advertising or trade
within the meaning of the privacy statute. 5 9 Further, the fact that

51 Foster, 128 A.D.3d at 159.
52 Id. (citing Thompson v. Close-Up, Inc., 98 N.Y.S.2d 300 (App. Div. 1950)).

"Id. at 161-63.

54

Id. at 160 (emphasis added).
id.
56 The court stated that the Fosters may have been able to raise the issue of
whether the photograph should be considered a work of art, but they failed to do
so. Id. at 159.
5 Foster, 128 A.D.3d at 160 (emphasis added, quotations omitted).
58 id.
55

59 id
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Svenson generated a profit from the sale did not weaken the
images' constitutional protection provided by the newsworthy and
public concern exception. 60
IV.

FUTURE IMPLICATIONS

The court's decision demonstrates its deference to
legislation when interpreting statutes. 6 1 The court expressly called
on the New York legislative branch to address shortcomings in the
privacy statute, and similar to the decision in Roberson which
sparked the legislative branch to enact the privacy statute, the
legislators listened once again. 62
In January 2017, New York Senate Bill No. 1648 was
introduced to amend §§ 50 - 51 of the Civil Rights Law. 63 The bill
proposes to prohibit the recording of visual images of a person
who has a "reasonable expectation of privacy while within a
dwelling, when such images are recorded by another person
outside the dwelling."64

60

Id. The Foster's further argued that just because the use of one's image or

likeness is a newsworthy issues or an issue of public concern, it should not be
exempt from being classified as advertising or trade if it was "obtained in an
improper manner." The court states they cite no authority for the claims but the
Fosters appeared to argue that the way in which Svenson took the photographs
constituted "the extreme and outrageous conduct contemplated by the tort of
intentional infliction of emotional distress" and should have "overcome the First
Amendment protection contemplated by [the privacy statute]." The court
analyzed the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress and the "high
bar" set for what would have constituted "outrageous behavior." The court
ultimately found that, Svenson conduct, as "disturbing" as it might have been, it
did not raise to the level of "extreme" or "outrageous" necessary under the law.
Id. at 163.
61 See Id. at 163.
62 Foster, 128 A.D.3d

at 154; see Roberson, 64 N.E. 442.
S. 1648, 2017 Leg., 239 Sess. (N.Y. 2017).
6 The proposed bill establishes a private cause of action and makes the
prohibited actions a misdemeanor. S. 1648, 2017 Leg., 239 Sess. (N.Y. 2017).
63
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Foster is mentioned in the Senate Committee Report as the
justification for the proposed bill because it clearly illuminates a
flaw in §§ 50 - 51. Currently, the statute does nothing to protect
people in their homes from unconsented images being captured
and "used in the course of artistic work." 6 5 'While current
prohibitions protect against advertising and trade purposes, the
protection does not extend far enough. The proposed bill aims to
fill in the gaps as technology advances and create a "zone of
privacy around the home" to protect people like the Fosters, who
reasonably expect privacy within their homes and freedom from
being secretly photographed or recorded.6 6
If the proposed bill fails to pass, the Foster court
mentioned an alternative option to future litigants by stating the
Fosters might have been able to raise the issue of whether the
photograph should be considered a work of art. 6 7 If injured parties
situated similarly to the Fosters instead raise the issue of what art
deserves protection under the First Amendment, a court would be
required to define what constitutes protected expression. This
would be problematic because "the law still does [not] know how
to define art," and different areas of law treat the word
differently. 6 8 For example, customs law imposes a subjective
standard and favors aesthetically pleasing fine art over industrial or
utilitarian arts.69 On the other hand, copyright law provides
greater protection for original works of art over derivative works.7 0

Committee Report, S. 1648, 2017 Leg., 239 Sess. (N.Y. 2017).
The legislative history states that any prohibited image or recording will fall
within the ambit of the amendment, "no matter the motive." Id.
67
Foster, 128 A.D.3d at 160.
68 St6phanie Giry, An Odd Bird, LEGAL AFFAIRS, September/October, 2002,
http://www.legalaffairs.org/issues/September-October2002/storygirysepoct2002.msp.
69 Giry supra note 69; see Brancusi v. United States, 54 Treas. Dec. 428 (Cust.
Ct. 1928) (changing the customs standard for art).
70 Giry, supra note
69.
65

66
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Well known works have an established reputation within
the market and are generally accepted as "art" whether
aesthetically pleasing, original, or otherwise. However, modem
art does not often have the same luxury, even a recognized artist,
writer, or director may create works that manK find shocking,
offensive, or too abstract to be considered "art."7 Justice Holmes
contemplates this issue in Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing
Co.: "It would be a dangerous undertaking for persons trained only
to the law to constitute themselves final judges of the worth of
pictorial illustrations, outside of the narrowest and most obvious
limits." 72

While Bleistein presents an

issue of copyright

protection, Justice Holmes' hesitation in considering himself
artistically competent to be art's final judge, is a familiar hesitation
within the judicial branch.7 3 The lack of appropriate knowledge
and expertise held by the courts to determine such an issue, makes
them reluctant to define it, and when it is necessary to define art,
courts will generally rely on expert witnesses. 74
Most importantly, a fundamental principle of First
Amendment protection is that the government may not restrict a
person's speech for their particular view; doing so imposes the
danger of governmental distortion of the marketplace by favoring
one idea over another.75 In Foster, Svenson's artistic expression
was protected as "art" under the First Amendment; the alternative
to the proposed bill and mentioned in the Foster opinion, would
require a court to determine whether an image itself should be
71 Artists throughout time have had to defend their work as art, and have
been

criticized for work that pushes boundaries and evokes negative reactions and
emotions. See 10 Works OfArt That Shocked The World, CNN Style, Jun. 29,
2015, http://www.cnn.com/2014/10/01/world/gallery/controversial-art/.
72 Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 251 (1903).
73

Id. at 251-52

74 Justice Holmes uses Goya's etching and Manet's paintings as examples of
works that would have been under appreciated as "art" that is not accepted in
their time, while today are generally considered masterpieces. Id. at 251.
75

DAVID L. HUDSON, JR., LEGAL ALMANAC: THE FIRST AMENDMENT: FREEDOM

OF SPEECH

§ 2:2 (2012).
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unprotected because it is disturbing or unfavorable. 7 6 Such a
determination would come dangerously close to the governmental
branch distorting the market by favoring certain ideas over
others.7 7
It is a vicious cycle "[bjecause art eludes definitions and
law needs to impose them," thus the law on art always seems to be
running after itself.78 The New York legislature's proposed bill
prohibits a disturbing behavior rather than disturbing or
unfavorable art.
V.

CONCLUSION

The holding in Fosterwas that the newsworthy and public
concern exemption applied and the allegations were insufficient to
show the photographs were used for the purpose of advertising or
trade under the statute. 7 9 Mentioned by the court, the troubling
facts of the case clearly illustrated the limited protection of the
privacy statute because Svenson's photographs were found to fall
outside of the privacy statute's reach during a time of "heightened
threats to privacy posed by new and ever more invasive
technologies." 8 0
The court, in examining the limitations of the exemption,
mentioned an alternative approach the Fosters could have taken. It
stated that the Fosters could have raised the question of whether a
particular image should be considered art, but the Fosters failed to
do so.8 1 The concern over such an approach is that it could be a
slippery slope to governmental market distortion, and restriction of
free speech and expression of ideas.

76

Foster, 128 A.D.3d at 160.

77

DAVID L. HUDSON, JR., LEGAL ALMANAC: THE FIRST AMENDMENT: FREEDOM

OF SPEECH § 2:2 (2012).
7 Giry, supra note 69.
79
Foster, 128 A.D.3d at 160.
s 0 1d. at 163.
" Id. at 160.
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However, reviewing only the issues brought before the
court, Foster's allegations were not sufficiently pleaded to remedy,
what felt like a violation of privacy, due to the limits of the
statute. 8 2 The court instead expressly called on legislators to mend
the holes and shortcoming of the statute, and just as in Roberson,
the decision sparked the legislative branch to act.8 In 2017, in
response to Foster, the New York Legislative branch proposed a
bill prohibiting Svenson's exact conduct. 8 4 This legislative
approach eliminates the need for courts to unnecessarily define art
and is a much less slippery slope. If the bill passes, New York's
legislators will have once again quickly reacted to an unsettling
shortcoming within their privacy statute; and New York "persons
trained only to the law" may go another day avoiding the
"dangerous undertaking" of constituting themselves the "final
judges of the worth of pictorial illustrations."8 5
*

Mary Bessone

8

2 Id. at 163.

Id. at 154; see Roberson, 64 N.E. 442.
8 S. 1648, 2017 Leg., 239 Sess. (N.Y. 2017).
Bleistein, 188 U.S. at 251.
83
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